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Abstract

The object of this paper is to outline the major events and policy issues related
to Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC in the last year. The paper is divided into three sections: (1) a general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European
Court cases, and European Commission decisions); (2) an outline of current policy issues, including competition and the liberal professions, review of the liner
conference block exemption, and modernisation of Art.82 EC; and (3) areas of
specific interest, meaning this year competition andgas supply, telecoms, sport,
and media.
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The object of this paper is to outline the major
events and policy issues related to Articles 81, 82
and 86 EC in the last year.1
The paper is divided into three sections:
(1) a general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European Court cases,
and European Commission decisions);
(2) an outline of current policy issues, including
competition and the liberal professions, review of the liner conference block exemption, and modernisation of Art.82 EC; and
(3) areas of specific interest, meaning this year
competition and gas supply, telecoms, sport,
and media.
In the first part, EC legislation and notices and
European Court cases are covered. The Commission’s decisions are outlined, together with current
policy issues and areas of specific interest, in next
month’s I.C.C.L.R.
In the author’s view, the main themes of 2003 are
as follows:
Table 1: Major Themes in 2003
— Enforcement through ‘‘object’’, ‘‘hardcore’’ and ‘‘per se’’
rules?
 the Michelin Case, cartels, the draft Notice on effect
on trade;
 unfair (given the huge fines)? Too formalistic for
‘‘modern’’ law?
 or a necessary enforcement rule (backed by the
courts)?
— Preparing for May 2004:
 Reg.1/2003;
 the ‘‘decentralisation package’’ of regulation and
notices;
 a new approach for practitioners?
— State action:
 the Italian Matches Case, French Beef and
Seamless Steel Tubes;
— TTBE reform and IP Guidelines:
 major changes: simplified BE, but now above the
thresholds?
— Arts 81(3) and 82 EC = clearance for the dominant
unless an abuse?
 Interbrew and more.



First, the author has been impressed, reading
through this year’s material, by the way that a great
deal of competition enforcement by administrations
relies on anti-competitive inferences from the nature
of the conduct in question. Practices are considered
to have the object of restricting competition and therefore are unlawful, even though their actual harmful
effects may not be proven. This is the case, for
example, with ‘‘per se’’ abusive fidelity rebates by
a dominant company, ‘‘hardcore’’ infringements,
such as price-fixing cartels, or restrictions on trade
between EU Member States, such as export bans.
The issue is also highlighted this year by the
Commission’s draft Notice on ‘‘effect of trade’’,
where there is extensive discussion of restrictions
‘‘inherently capable’’ of restricting competition.
A major theme this year is whether this is right,
especially when the fines now can be huge (e.g. one
company in a cartel was fined e249 million this
year). Given also the ‘‘modernisation’’ of EC competition law to emphasise effect more than form,
and the way that enforcement will now be decentralised, the issue is whether this should change.
From cases such as Michelin, it appears that the
European Court of First Instance may think that
some classic infringements should remain ‘‘per se’’
rules. At least in other cases there appears to be
more focus on effect.
Secondly, a great deal of material this year relates
to preparing for the new, decentralised EC competition enforcement model: Regulation 1/2003 and,
more recently, a whole new package of related draft
legislation and notices. Interestingly, this may involve key changes to the way practitioners advise.
The question is no longer: would DG Competition
be likely to accept this? Although the Commission
will remain central, the question for practitioners,
after decentralisation, is more: would any EU
national competition authority or national court
be likely to accept this? Perhaps at times forcing a
slightly more conservative view.
Thirdly, the different ways that State action is
treated are illustrated this year. In cases described
in the paper:




the Italian competition authority was found to
be entitled to disallow a national law contrary
to EC competition law, but not to fine
companies which abided by such a national
context (Italian Matches);
the Commission still fined a French slaughterhouse association despite great governmental pressure to enter into an unlawful
*With many thanks to Ingrid Cloosterin and Fiona
Shotter for their help in the production of this paper;
and Axel Gutermuth, Deirdre Waters, Lorelien Hoet,
Natalie McNelis, Frédéric Louis, Anne Vallery and
Naboth Van den Broeck for their contributions.
1. The reference period is from November 2002 until
October 2003. This is a slightly revised version of a paper
given at the IBC Advanced EC Competition Law conference
in Brussels, November 2003.
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agreement with French farmers, in the depths
of the beef crisis (French Beef); and
in another case, the Commission imposed no
fine on companies involved in a cartel for a
period when an EU–Japan voluntary restraint
agreement applied (Seamless Steel Tubes).

It appears that state action to restrict competition,
whether formal or informal, is still very topical at
the moment.
Fourthly, there is much discussion about reform
of the transfer of technology block exemption and
what to do above the proposed market-share ceilings therein. This is still being debated on recently
published drafts.
However, one interesting point in the IP
Guidelines (and also the Commission’s proposed
Notice on Art.81(3) EC) is the way that the Commission is envisaging Art.81(3) EC clearance for a
practice, even by a dominant company, provided
that this does not result in an abuse. The Commission refers to Tetra Pak I, a case in which the issue
was whether a dominant company could buy another
company which held an exclusive patent licence
for a rival technology.2 The Court found that:
‘‘The mere fact that an undertaking in a dominant
position acquires an exclusive patent licence does
not per se constitute abuse within the meaning of
[what was then] Article 86 of the Treaty. For the purpose of applying Article 86, the circumstances surrounding the acquisition, and in particular its effects
on the structure of competition in the relevant market,
must be taken into account’’ (emphasis added).

Finally, a related theme is a similar trend to allow
justified agreements involving dominant companies
in the Commission’s decisions. Thus, in Interbrew,
discussed below, the Commission allowed this
leading Belgian brewery, with some 56 per cent
market share, still to have ‘‘50% of total beer’’
requirements contracts.
All very interesting and encouraging for the
dominant, even if this may need some further
work before it is clear what is likely to be allowed.

Overview of major events
Legislative developments (adopted and
proposed)
Table 2: New Legislation/Notices (Adopted)
— Reg.1/2003:
 no surprises, but a huge change coming in May
2004 (with Enlargement by 10);
 an ‘‘ECN’’ of 26 with the Commission at the centre;
 no notifications and decentralised Art.81(3) EC;
— insurance block exemption;
— EU–Japan co-operation agreement (joining US/
Canadian equivalents).

Adopted
Regulation 1/2003
In December 2002, the Council adopted the new
‘‘Regulation 17’’ (Reg.1/2003), setting up the new
decentralised enforcement system for EC competition law, to come into force on May 1, 2004.3 It may
be useful to outline the key features of this huge
change once again.
First, the Commission will no longer be the only
authority able to rule that the conditions of
Art.81(3) EC are satisfied. Both national competition authorities (‘‘NCAs’’) and national courts
may do so also. The burden of proof of the infringement is on the party or authority alleging it; the
burden of claiming the benefit of Art.81(3) EC is on
the company claiming that it applies (Arts 1 and 2).
Secondly, European competition law enforcement will now be shared fully with the national
competition authorities of the Member States. The
Commission will carry out enforcement within
the procedural framework set out in Reg.1/2003.
The NCAs will operate on the basis of Reg.1, related
EC case law and their own national procedural
systems.
Thirdly, if Member States apply national competition laws to cases involving an effect on trade
between Member States, they must also apply EC
competition law. If Art.81(1) EC is concerned, the
parallel application may not lead to divergent outcomes. If Art.82 EC is concerned, a Member State
can apply stricter national competition rules
(Art.3).
Fourthly, the notification system is abolished,
with all pending case procedures on May 1, 2004
‘‘lapsing’’. At the end of 2002, the Commission’s
antitrust ‘‘backlog’’ was 805, after 321 new antitrust
cases and 363 cases closed.4 As a result, from May
2004, more than before, companies will have to
review for themselves whether their agreements
and practices may infringe the EC competition rules.
However, it will be a slightly different type of
assessment, concerned more with whether any relevant competition authority or court which may
have to deal with a case would be likely to find an
infringement and, if so, what consequences could
follow, and less with what the Commission’s current approach is (although that clearly will also
remain relevant).
Fifthly, there are structures for co-ordination
between the Commission and the NCAs, including
the transfer of cases and related files, and the
exchange of confidential information (Arts 11–
14). The enforcement concept is one of a ‘‘European
Competition Network’’ (‘‘ECN’’) with the Commission at the centre, but also with possibilities
3. [2003] O.J. L1/1; Council Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 of
December 16, 2002.
4. 2002 EC Commission Report on Competition Policy:
Introduction, paras 5–7, and ID statistics tables at pp.46–47.

2. Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11 309.
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for cases to move from one national competition
authority to another.
Importantly, national competition authorities
will be able to use confidential information obtained
in Commission investigations in their own national
competition law procedures, where these are in
parallel to application of the EC rules.
Key also is the right of the Commission in
Art.11(6) to initiate proceedings, thereby pulling a
case to Brussels even if an NCA has already started
acting on it. Only the Commission can take declaratory decisions on its own initiative, ruling that Arts
81 or 82 EC do not apply to an agreement or practice
(Art.10).
Sixthly, there are parallel but different coordination procedures as between the Commission, NCAs and the national courts (Art.15). Essentially, Member States are to send national judgments
on EC rules to the Commission. NCAs may offer
written observations to the national courts of their
Member State and make oral observations, if the
Court so allows. The Commission may also do so,
where the coherent application of Arts 81 and 82 EC
so requires. The Commission will also provide
information to national courts or its opinion on
questions concerning the application of the EC
rules, if the national court asks.
Seventhly, giving effect to Masterfoods I,5 both
NCAs and national courts must not take decisions
which ‘‘run counter’’ to a Commission decision
concerning the same agreements or practices, or a
decision in proceedings initiated by the Commission (Art.16).
Eighthly, Reg.1 also modifies the Commission’s
enforcement powers in important ways:






The Commission will have the power to interview a person or company, with their consent
(Art.19);
the Commission will have the power to inspect premises other than a company’s, including the homes of company directors and
staff, if there is a reasonable suspicion that
evidence is being kept there and prior
authorisation has been obtained from a
national judicial authority of the Member
State concerned (Art.21);
the Commission may ‘‘seal’’ business premises and books or records if necessary for an
inspection (and can ask for explanations of
facts or documents related to an inspection)
(Art.20.2(d), (e)).

Ninthly, the Commission is to have the right to
take ‘‘structural remedies’’, if required, in defined
circumstances. Notably, such remedies have to be:
(i) proportionate to the infringement; (ii) necessary
to bring the infringement effectively to an end; and
(iii) there must be no equally effective behavioural
5. Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd,
Judgment of December 14, 2000; [2000] E.C.R. I-11369.



remedy, or that behavioural remedy would be more
burdensome for the company concerned than the
structural remedy (Art.7).
Fines and penalties have also significantly
increased (Arts 23–24). A ‘‘procedural’’ infringement (such as providing misleading information)
may lead to a fine not exceeding 1 per cent of the
total turnover of a company in the business year
preceding the Commission’s decision. A ‘‘full’’
infringement (of Arts 81 or 82 EC, of an interim
measures decision, or of a decision making a commitment given by a company binding) may lead to
a fine of 10 per cent of such turnover. Periodic
penalty payments for non-compliance with a procedural or full infringement may be set at not more
than 5 per cent of the average daily turnover of a
company in question in the year preceding the
Commission’s decision.
Tenthly, the Commission’s powers to take various measures are confirmed, notably:





Interim measures (Art.8);
sectoral reviews ‘‘where the trend of trade
between Member States, the rigidity of prices
or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted’’ (Art.17); and
withdrawal of block exemptions where, in
particular cases, it finds certain effects incomparable with Art.81(3) EC (NCAs have a
similar right if such effects occur in a distinct
geographic market in their territory) (Art.29).

Finally, we will all have to get used to new
numbers. An ‘‘Article 11 letter’’ will be an ‘‘Article
18 letter’’; a ‘‘dawn raid’’ will be based on Art.20, not
Art.14. An ‘‘Article 19(3) Notice’’ should not occur
in the same way because notification will have
gone. However, the negative decisions envisaged
in Art.10 will still be preceded by a notice seeking
third-party comments, based now on ‘‘Art.27(4)’’.
A whole series of related notices have now been
published for comment and are discussed below
under proposed legislation.
Insurance block exemption
In February 2003, the Commission adopted and
published the revised insurance block exemption.6
This was discussed last year in detail as a draft.7
EU–Japan co-operation agreement
In July 2003, the European Union signed a cooperation agreement with Japan on competition
matters, similar to those entered into with the
United States and Canada.8
6. [2003] O.J. L53/8.
7. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 45–46. See also Charro, ‘‘New block
exemption for the insurance sector’’ (2003) Competition
Law Insight 5 at p.17; Ryan, EC Commission Competition
Policy Newsletter, No.2—Summer 2003 at pp.51–52.
8. IP/03/995, July 10, 2003; [2003] O.J. L183/12.
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Proposed
Table 3: New Legislation/Notices (Proposed/Coming)
— A revised TTBE:
 NB market-share ceilings: 20 per cent combined
(competitor); 30 per cent individually (noncompetitor);
 only two party agreements;
 distribution parallels;
 copyright software licensing included;
— Proposed IP Guidelines:
 no exemption if abuse? Clearance if dominant?
 technology pools;
— The decentralisation package:
 guidance on ‘‘novel’’ issues;
 ‘‘NAAT’’ presumptions: less than 5 per cent market
share and less than e40 million EU turnover = not
EC law; agreement ‘‘inherently’’ capable of affecting
trade greater than e40 million = EC law;
 Art.81(3) EC and efficiencies: economics and proof;
encouragement for dominant companies.

A revised transfer of technology block exemption
On October 1, 2003, the Commission published the
draft successor to the Transfer of Technology Block
Exemption, Reg.240/96 (‘‘the TTBE’’), together with
draft Guidelines on the application of Art.81 EC to
technology transfer agreements (‘‘the IP Guidelines’’).9 The main points in the draft Regulation
are as follows.
First, the Commission has hugely simplified the
TTBE, applying a ‘‘black-listed’’ (prohibited) clause
approach, but abandoning the ‘‘white and grey’’
lists of clauses permitted or ‘‘permitted under certain conditions’’.
The black-list for agreements between competitors covers: (i) pricing restrictions; (ii) output
restrictions (except in a non-reciprocal licence);
(iii) the allocation of markets or customers (except
for field of use or product market restrictions in a
non-reciprocal licence and ‘‘own use’’ requirements on licensees); and (iv) (non-compete) restrictions on a licensee exploiting its own technology, or
the parties’ ability to carry out R&D ‘‘unless such
latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the
disclosure of the licensed know-how to third parties’’ (Art.4.1).
In the case of non-competitors, the black-list
covers: (i) pricing restrictions (although maximum
prices may be set or recommendations given); and
(ii) restrictions on territories or customers which
may be supplied (although the licensor’s territory/
customer group can be protected, and active sales
into another licensee’s territory/customer group
can be restricted, as well as licensee ‘‘own use’’
requirements). Restrictions on wholesalers supplying end-users and selective distributors supplying
9. Draft Commission Regulation on the application of
Art.81(3) of the Treaty, [2003] O.J. C-235/10 (proposed
TTBE), and p.17 (proposed IP Guidelines). IP/03/1341,
October 3, 2003.



unauthorised distributors are also allowed
(Art.4.2).
If black-listed clauses are included in an agreement, it is not covered by the draft TTBE.
Other specific obligations are not exempted by
the block exemption:






Compulsory grant-back clauses for a licensee’s
own severable improvements or new applications of licensed technology;
compulsory assignment clauses for improvements or new applications of the licensed
technology; and
no-challenge clauses as regards the validity/
secrecy or substantiality of IP rights.

Output restrictions in non-reciprocal agreements
between competitors or non-compete provisions in
agreements between non-competitors (unless indispensable to protect the disclosure of the licensed
know-how to third parties) are also not block
exempt (Art.5).
Secondly, the draft Regulation covers copyright
software licensing, and extends to the provision of
goods or services as well as licensed manufacturing. Perhaps because of this the draft TTBE has far
more of a sense of vertical distribution issues than
its predecessor and also deals with selective distribution through licensees.
Thirdly, as expected, the Commission does
not block exempt multiparty technology pools,
but rather reserves block exemption for two-party
agreements (Art.2). Technology pools are, however, extensively discussed in the IP Guidelines.10
It was understood this might happen because the
Commission needs the new TTBE in force for May
1, 2004, or at the least to have resolved issues formerly tending to opposition procedure applications or full notification. The Commission has
also published on its website a major study on
technology pools, prepared by Charles River
Associates.11
Fourthly, as noted above, the Commission has
pursued the approach of varying what is blacklisted and the conditions for block exemption
according to whether licences are between competitors or not. ‘‘Actual competitors’’ are companies that license competing technologies or are
both active on the relevant product/geographic
market. ‘‘Potential competitors’’ would, ‘‘on realistic grounds’’, undertake the necessary investments or incur the necessary switching costs to
enter the relevant product/geographical market,
in the event of a small and permanent increase in
relative prices.
Fifthly, the Commission has continued with its
‘‘economic approach’’, limiting the possibility for
block exemption to agreements between parties
10. Paras 202–228.
11. Antitrust: Report by Charles River Associates on
Multiparty Licensing, April 22, 2003.
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having only defined levels of market share. This
was also expected, but is controversial, a similar
approach having been ultimately dropped for
Reg.240/96. This time the Commission does not
fear a mass of notifications, since the system will be
abolished as the new TTBE comes into force.
The ‘‘ceiling’’ for the benefit of the new TTBE will
be 20 per cent for agreements between competitors,
meaning that the combined share of the parties on
the relevant technology or product market must not
exceed this level (Art.3.1).
In the case of agreements between noncompetitors, the ceiling is significantly higher, 30
per cent, meaning that the individual share of each
party on the relevant markets must not exceed that
level (Art.3.2).
In contrast to the Commission’s fairly positive
position as regards agreements above the Vertical
Restraints Block Exemption (‘‘the VRBE’’) ceiling,
the Commission emphasises that there ‘‘can be no
presumption’’ that technology transfer agreements
above these thresholds which fall within Art.81(1)
EC will ‘‘usually give rise to the objective advantages’’ to outweigh any disadvantages which they
create for competition.12
Sixthly, the Commission has pursued the model
of the VRBE, as regards the ‘‘modified’’ exclusivity
system for licensees in the draft TTBE. The licensor
continues to have absolute territorial protection,
presumably on the basis that without that, he would
not license for fear of establishing companies to
compete against himself. Licensees, however, only
have protection against active sales efforts into
their territories. There is no ‘‘phased release’’ system over time as in Reg.240/96, whereby licensees
have full territorial protection for a period and
‘‘modified exclusivity’’, with protection against
active sales efforts later.
Finally, one may note that the draft TTBE reflects
the VRBE concept of withdrawal of the block
exemption by the Commission and NCAs (e.g.
‘‘where the incentives to innovate are reduced or
where access to the markets is hindered’’,13 and,
interestingly, also where parallel networks of
licences may have restrictive effects14).
Proposed IP Guidelines15
The proposed Commission Guidelines contain (on
almost 40 pages):



Detailed explanations on the provisions of
the proposed TTBE;
principles for the treatment under Art.81
EC of technology licensing agreements not

12. Recital 12.
13. Recital 16.
14. Recitals 17 and 18.
15. With thanks to Axel Gutermuth for his assistance
with this section.





covered by the TTBE, including discussion of
royalty obligations, exclusive licensing, sales
restrictions, output restrictions, field of use
restrictions, captive use restrictions, tying
and non-compete obligations; and
criteria for assessing technology pools, settlement agreements and non-assertion agreements, which, by definition, fall outside the
TTBE.

General principles for the application of Article 81
EC to technology licensing agreements not covered
by the proposed TTBE If a technology licensing
agreement is not covered by the proposed TTBE, an
individual assessment in light of the market circumstances will establish whether the agreement
restricts competition and is, therefore, caught by
Art.81(1) EC. The only exceptions are hardcore
provisions, which are considered to restrict competition by their very nature. Negative market effects may be on price, output, innovation, or the
variety or quality of goods and services.
The proposed Guidelines focus on three types of
possible restriction:
(1) Inter-technology restrictions, i.e. restrictions
on actual or potential competition that would
have existed had no licence been granted
(including the facilitation of explicit or tacit
collusion). Normally, these will be caught by
Art.81(1) EC.
(2) Intra-technology restrictions, i.e. restrictions
on competition that would have existed if
the licence had been granted without the
allegedly restrictive provision. These are
also normally caught by Art.81(1) EC, unless
the provision is objectively necessary for the
conclusion of the agreement. For example,
territorial restraints between non-competitors
may fall outside Art.81(1) EC if they are
objectively necessary in order to penetrate a
new market.
(3) Foreclosure of competitors can arise by raising their costs, restricting their access to
essential inputs or otherwise raising barriers
to entry.
Factors that the Commission will take into account
when assessing restrictive effects include the
nature of the agreement, the market position of
the parties as well as of competitors and buyers
of the licensed products, entry barriers, and the
maturity of the market.
If an agreement restricts competition, it is still
legal (under the new Reg.1/2003) if justified by its
positive market effects under Art.81(3) EC.
In practice, exemption will often turn on
whether parties with high market shares meet the
fourth condition under Art.81(3) EC, i.e. they must
not have the potential to eliminate competition.
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Interestingly, the Commission states (as in the
draft Guidelines on Art.81(3) EC discussed below)
that a bar to clearance under Art.81(3) EC only
exists if the agreement amounts to an abuse of a
dominant position under Art.82 EC.16 The key point
is that dominance alone is not to preclude such
clearance.
This appears to widen the commercial possibilities for dominant companies and therefore
should be welcome to many. However, the proposal
may still leave companies and their advisers in
some doubt about what they can do!17
Specific licensing provisions in agreements that
fall outside the proposed TTBE For technology
licensing agreements that fall outside the scope of
the proposed TTBE, the proposed Guidelines discuss how the following commonly found licensing
provisions should be assessed:









Royalty payment obligation on the licensee;
exclusive licensing, i.e. an obligation on the
licensor not to give other licenses;
sales restrictions on the licensee or licensor;
output restrictions;
field of use restrictions on the licensee;
captive use restrictions on the licensee;
tying obligations on the licensee; and
non-compete obligations on the licensee.

The assessment of these provisions under the
proposed Guidelines depends on whether or not
the parties are competitors and, if they are, whether
or not the restriction or obligation is reciprocal.
Additional factual distinctions are made with regard to some of the provisions.
The proposed Guidelines are too detailed to
summarise usefully here. The following general
remarks can be made.
As a general rule, these restrictions and obligations are least problematic if entered into by
non-competitors, more problematic if entered into
by competitors, and most problematic if entered
into by competitors in reciprocal licensing agreements. In addition, restrictions in agreements between non-competitors preventing the licensee from
using the licensed technology to compete against
the licensor are generally looked upon favourably,
on the premise that a technology owner would be
likely to refrain from licensing if he cannot prevent
such competition to his own technology.
Finally, the proposed Guidelines state that
the following licensing provisions will not be
considered to be restrictive of competition
16. Para.142, citing Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak I [1990]
E.C.R. II-309.
17. The draft Commission Guidelines on the application
of Art.81(3), which have been published as part of the
Commission’s draft ‘‘modernization package’’ and are set
to come into force on May 1, 2004 also, do not provide in
their current form significant additional guidance on the
issue.



regardless of market circumstances: confidentiality obligations; obligations on the licensee not to
sub-license; obligations not to use the licensed
technology after the expiry of the agreement, provided that the licensed IP remains valid and in
force; obligations to assist the licensor in enforcing
the licensed intellectual property rights; obligations to pay minimum royalties or to produce a
minimum quantity of products incorporating the
licensed technology; and obligations on the licensee to use the licensor’s trade mark or indicate
the name of the licensor on the product.
Assessment of technology pools Long-awaited by
many industries, the proposed Guidelines provide
guidance on the assessment of technology pools.
Technology pools are arrangements, regardless of
their form, whereby two or more parties assemble a
package of technology that is licensed not only to
members of the pool, but also to third parties.
Technology pools may set an industry standard,
but can also support competing standards. Licences
granted by a pool to third parties fall within the
scope of the proposed TTBE, but the pooling agreements themselves do not.
Technology pools are assessed according to the
following principles:










Pools combining essential technologies will
normally fall outside Art.81(1) EC. A technology is essential if there are no substitutes
inside or outside the pool and the technology
constitutes a necessary part of the package of
pooled technologies.
Pool agreements encompassing complementary technologies, where there are substitutes
outside the pool for the included technologies, are likely to be caught by Art.81(1)
EC if the pool has a significant market position on any relevant market.
Relevant for the Commission’s assessment
are, notably, whether there are any procompetitive reasons for including the technology in the pool, whether the licensors
remain free to license their technologies independently, and whether licensees can limit
the license to certain parts of the package
and obtain a corresponding reduction of
royalties.
Technologies are complements rather than
substitutes (the Guidelines recognise that the
distinction is not always clear cut) when they
are required from a technological point of
view to produce the product or carry out the
process to which the technologies relate.
Pooling of substitute technologies will generally be considered to violate Art.81 EC.

The Guidelines also discuss additional considerations that are relevant in the assessment of
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technology pools. Companies should be aware of
the following principles, in particular:





Pools that hold a strong position on the market should be open and non-discriminatory;
pools should not unduly foreclose thirdparty technologies or limit the creation of
alternative pools;
the risk of a pool violating Art.81 EC can be
further reduced if participation in the process of setting up the pool is open to all
interested parties, independent experts are
involved in the creation and operation of the
pool, the exchange of sensitive information
among the parties is limited, and a dispute
resolution mechanism exists.

Non-assertion and settlement agreements Nonassertion and settlement agreements normally fall
outside of Art.81(1) EC, but their terms and conditions may restrict competition. The Guidelines
express caution towards restrictions on the use of
the technology and towards royalty payments other
than by a one-way lump sum payment.
The decentralisation package18
In October 2003, the Commission entered the next
phase of consultation on its modernisation and
decentralisation proposals, with the publication
of a draft Regulation on Commission proceedings
under Arts 81 and 82 EC, and a number of draft
guidance Notices designed to assist NCAs and
courts in the application of the competition rules.
These measures fill out the new decentralised
competition system which is set to be fully operational when Council Reg.1/2003 comes into effect
on May 1, 2004 (with the next Enlargement) and
replaces Reg.17/62. The Commission has invited
all interested parties to provide comments on the
draft procedural Regulation and the package of
draft Notices by December 5.
The package contains:







A draft Regulation on Commission proceedings under Arts 81 and 82 EC;
a draft Notice on co-operation within the
European network of NCAs (the ECN);
a draft Notice on co-operation between the
Commission and national courts;
a draft Notice on the handling of complaints
by the Commission under Arts 81 and 82 EC;
a draft Notice on ‘‘novel questions’’ of Arts 81
and 82 EC that arise in individual cases;
draft Guidelines on the concept of ‘‘effect on
trade’’ (the dividing line between the application of EC or national competition law); and

18. With thanks to Lorelien Hoet and Deirdre Waters for
their assistance with this section.





draft Guidelines on the application of
Art.81(3) EC.

Each of these measures is examined below. The
Notice on ‘‘novel questions’’, the Notice on ‘‘effect
on trade’’ and the Guidelines on Art.81(3) EC
involve important new material.
Draft Commission Regulation on proceedings
General. The draft Regulation deals with a broad
range of topics, such as the initiation of proceedings
by the Commission, time limits, investigations by
the Commission, handling of complaints, the right
to be heard and access to the file. The Regulation is
partly based on Reg.2842/98 on the hearing of parties in Arts 81 and 82 EC cases, and also, to some
extent, on the Commission’s Notice on access to the
file from 1997.19
The main new points are as follows.
Interviews by the Commission. Art.2 of the draft
Regulation sets out the formalities which are to be
respected where the Commission conducts interviews and takes statements (Art.19 of Reg.1/2003),
or where Commission representatives ask oral questions during inspections (Art.20(2)(e) of Reg.1/
2003). Basically, the rule is that the Commission
may record the statements or declarations made,
but it must always provide a copy of any such
recording to the interviewee, or investigated undertaking, and allow this person to communicate rectifications on this recording within a certain deadline.
Complaints. Art.7(2) now explicitly provides
that, where the Commission has informed a complainant of its reasons for rejecting a complaint and
the party in question has not reacted within the set
deadline (in principle at least four weeks), the
Commission shall reject the complaint by decision.
Furthermore, if the Commission rejects a complaint
because another authority is dealing with the case,
the Commission shall communicate to the complainant which NCA will deal with the case.
Access to the file. The draft Regulation itself sets
out basic rights and principles regarding access,
which is new, since previously this was only in a
Notice.
Draft Notice on co-operation within the network
of competition authorities General. This draft
Notice deals with the division of work between
the different NCAs and the Commission, the
consistent application of EC competition rules,
and the functioning of the Advisory Committee.
The Notice is to replace the 1997 Notice on
co-operation between the NCAs and the

19. Commission Notice on the internal rules of procedure
for processing requests for access to the file in cases under
Arts 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Arts 65 and 66 of the ECSC
Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No.4064/89, [1997]
O.J. C-23/3.
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Commission.20 Much of this is new. Material closely
overlapping with Reg.1 is not described here.
Principles on work-sharing. Under the new
framework, cases can be dealt with by a single
NCA, several NCAs (possibly with one NCA taking
lead) or the Commission. In most cases, the NCA
receiving a complaint or leniency application will
deal with it. Where necessary, however, a case may
be ‘‘reallocated’’ within the ECN on the basis of
discussions between the authorities.
There is much controversy as to whether this
will constitute an appealable act, with concern on
the one hand that procedural differences of enforcement may be material, and on the other that procedural appeals, which can take years, would delay
substantive enforcement. In some cases, there may
be clear advantages to cases being dealt with at
national level (e.g. where the NCA has already
done a lot of factual work in the area), while in
others there may be disadvantages, as where positions seem entrenched and not sufficiently to
reflect the broader interests of EU competition.
Cases of reallocation should normally be resolved within two months from the moment when
the NCAs inform the Commission under Art.11(3) of
Reg.1/2003.21 The Advisory Committee can also function as a forum for the discussion of case allocation.
Criteria for work-sharing. An NCA is considered
to be ‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with a case if there is a
‘‘material link’’ with the NCA’s territory; competition there is substantially affected by an infringement; the NCA is able to effectively bring to an end
the infringement; and the NCA can gather the
necessary evidence/proof.22
The Commission is considered particularly
‘‘well-placed’’ to deal with a case if agreements/
practices have effects in three or more countries, or
if its involvement is required for development of EC
competition policy, effective enforcement, or appropriate because of a close link with other EC
provisions belonging to Commission competence.23
An NCA is in principle well-placed to deal with
cases that have a major effect on the territory of its
Member State. Where a practice has its main effects
in the territory of two or three Member States, it is
suggested that these NCAs should consider working together on a case.
Importantly, the Regulation provides that the
allocation of cases does not create individual rights
for undertakings to have a case dealt with by a
particular authority.24
Exchange of information. In general, the possibilities to exchange (confidential) information
among the different NCAs and the Commission
20. Commission Notice on cooperation between national
competition authorities and the Commission in handling
cases falling within the scope of Arts 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, [1997] O.J. C-313/3.
21. Para.18.
22. Para.8.
23. Paras 14–15.
24. Para.31.



are very extensive, and may be expected to give
rise to discussions as to the rights of defence.
Regulation 1/2003 contains limits which may be
important for companies and individuals,25 notably:




Information exchanged cannot be used to
impose sanctions on individuals (as opposed
to sanctions on undertakings/companies),
unless the transmitting authority is able to
impose similar sanctions on individuals, or,
in the opposite case, if the receiving authority
maintains the same level of protection for
individuals as the transmitting authority in
the case at hand. This is particularly relevant
where national procedural law provides for
criminal sanctions on individuals, as now in
the United Kingdom.
Information exchanged within the ECN can
only be used for the purpose of the application of EC and, where applicable, national
competition law (applied in parallel and only
if leading to the same outcome), and for the
‘‘subject-matter for which it was collected’’.

An application for leniency to a given authority
is not to be considered as an application for
leniency to any other authority.26 As a result, in
particular because of the importance of timing in
such applications, it may be in the interest of undertakings therefore to apply for leniency to all NCAs
which may be considered ‘‘well-placed’’ to act.
The draft Notice also specifies that:




Information forwarded to the ECN by the
authority that has received a leniency application will not be used by the other members
as a basis for starting an investigation, but
they may do so on the basis of information
from other sources.27
Information voluntarily submitted by a
leniency applicant, or information obtained
through an inspection which resulted from
the leniency application, will only be transmitted with the consent of the applicant,
unless the receiving NCA has also received
a leniency application, or the receiving NCA
has committed itself in writing not to use the
information to impose sanctions on the
leniency applicant, its employees or any
other person covered by such application.28

The Commission has also made it clear that it
would like all Member States to adopt appropriate
(at best comparable) leniency programmes. Not all
have explicit rules to this effect yet. Practitioners
would agree that there may be an artificial tendency
to go to Brussels first, rather than rely on less
explicit rules at national level, even though the
centre of gravity of a case is clearly national.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Para.28.
Para.38.
Para.39.
Para.40.
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Draft Notice on co-operation between the Commission and the national courts General. The
draft Notice elaborates on the co-operation principles and mechanisms provided for by the case law
of the European Courts and Reg.1/2003. The Notice
is to replace the 1993 Notice on co-operation
between national courts and the Commission.29
Some of this is new, some just a summary of existing
law.
The main points are as follows:












Where a national court applies national competition law to practices falling under Arts 81
or 82 EC, it must also apply Arts 81 or 82 EC to
these practices (Art.3(1) of Reg.1/2003).
Practices that are in accordance with Art.81
EC may not be prohibited under national
competition law (Art.3(2) of Reg.1/2003).
Practices that are not in accordance with
Art.81 EC cannot be allowed under national
competition law (Walt Wilhelm).30
The general principle of primacy of Community law requires national courts to disapply provisions of national law that conflict
with EC law rules (Simmenthal/Consorzio
Industrie Fiammiferi).31
National courts cannot adopt decisions that
conflict with prior Commission decisions
(Art.16(1) of Reg.1/2003).32 The only way for
national courts to escape the binding effect of
a Commission decision is through a request
for a preliminary ruling (or by distinguishing
on the facts).
National courts must also avoid adopting
decisions that conflict with decisions contemplated by the Commission (Art.16(1) of
Reg.1/2003). National courts may for this
reason decide to stay proceedings (Delimitis,33
Masterfoods34).

Procedural aspects of the national courts’ application of EC competition law. National courts are to
apply their own procedural laws in the absence of
Community procedural law. The draft Notice recalls, however, the case law of the European courts
requiring that:


Sanctions for infringement of EC law be effective, proportionate and dissuasive (Commission v Greece)35;

29. Notice on cooperation between national courts and
the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, [1993] O.J. C-39/6.
30. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm [1969] E.C.R. 1; Joined
Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79, Giry and Guerlain [1980]
E.C.R. 2327.
31. Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] E.C.R. 629; Case
C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi [2003] E.C.R. 49.
32. Art.16(2) provides a similar rule for NCAs.
33. Case C-234/89, Delimitis [1991] E.C.R. I-935.
34. Case C-344/98, Masterfoods [2000] E.C.R. I-11369.
35. Case 68/88, Commission v Greece [1989] E.C.R. 2965.






infringements of EC law causing harm must
give rise to damages (Crehan, etc.)36;
national procedural law applied to enforce
EC law must not make such enforcement
excessively difficult (Rewe/Comet)37 and
must not be less favourable than rules applied to enforce national law (Rewe, etc.).

This is likely to be a developing area in national
court cases, as plaintiffs seek to benefit from any
higher standards of procedural law which are relevant (at least pending any possible harmonisation
of procedural law).
Co-operation between Commission and national
courts—Commission as ‘‘amicus curiae’’. The
Commission’s assistance to national courts may
take different forms38:






The Commission has the duty to transmit
information to national courts that seek it,
e.g. documents held by Commission, information on whether Commission is dealing/
has dealt with a case, and information on the
timing of a decision (see Art.15(1) of Reg.1/
2003). To some extent, this has been done in
the past, but with mixed results. This may
well increase in the future.
The national court may ask the Commission’s
opinion on economic, factual and legal matters (Art.15(1) of Reg.1/2003). However, the
Commission will not consider the merits of
the case.39 Again, this has been done in the
past, sometimes even by arbitrators. This also
may increase in the future.
The Commission may submit written observations to the national court with regard
to particular cases, where the coherent
application of Arts 81–82 EC so requires
(Art.15(3) ).40 This is an important possibility, to be used on points of law, which
may perhaps allow for more realistic decisions in terms of time than the wholly unacceptable 12-year saga of Masterfoods II.41
Observations may also be oral if the court
agrees.

Pursuant to Art.287 EC, the Commission may
only transmit information covered by professional
secrecy if the court can guarantee protection of

36. e.g. Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan [2001] E.C.R.
6297; Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich [1991]
E.C.R. I-5357; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie
du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] E.C.R. I-1029.
37. e.g. Case 33/76, Rewe [1976] E.C.R. 1989; Case 45/76,
Comet [1967] E.C.R. 2043.
38. Paras 21–35.
39. Para.29.
40. The NCAs can also do so without the requirement that
this is ‘‘necessary for the coherent application’’ of the law.
41. The Commission itself sees it as more of an exceptional measure than a systematic practice, the whole idea
being to decentralise enforcement, leaving matters to
others to decide.
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confidential business secrets. It is an open question
how this will work.
The assistance offered by the Commission does
not bind the national court. It is hoped that the
Commission will treat this more openly than in the
past, providing comments as it does in Art.234
(formerly Art.177) EC submissions to the European
Court of Justice (‘‘ECJ’’). In the end, the court decides, and, if uncertain, can still refer to the ECJ.
For reasons of objectivity, the Commission will
not hear any of the parties about its assistance to the
national courts. If it has had contacts with any of the
parties, it will simply inform the court thereof.
Otherwise, the draft notes that the Commission
must be provided with copies of all judgments of
national courts applying Arts 81–82 EC (Art.15(2)
of Reg.1/2003).
Draft Notice on the handling of complaints under
Articles 81 and 82 EC General. This Notice gives
indications when to complain to the Commission
or an NCA or to bring a case before a national court,
and sets out the procedure for treatment of complaints by the Commission. Most of this is not new.
However, it is useful to see the proposed ‘‘route
map’’.
The following are the main points:






As between the national courts and the competition authorities, the Commission emphasises that:
— The competition authorities act in the
general interest and must thus set priorities in the treatment of cases;
— national courts are to safeguard rights of
individuals and are bound to rule on a
certain case.
As between the Commission and an NCA:
— The Commission invites complainants
to target the appropriate authority in
order to reduce the potential need for
reallocation within the ECN. Presumably, over time, we will know when to
go where—it is not that clear now, partly
because of the built-in flexibility of the
system as proposed.
The Commission notes that persons/undertakings can choose between:
— Lodging a formal complaint; or
— providing ‘‘market information’’ to the
Commission which can be the starting
point for an investigation by the Commission. Apparently, the idea is that this
can be done on the Commission’s special
website,42 even on an anonymous basis!

Requirement of legitimate interest. A legitimate interest may be claimed by undertakings,
42. See http://europa.eu.int/dgcomp/info-on-anticompetitive-practices.



associations of undertakings entitled to represent
their interests, consumer organisations and public
authorities, for example in their capacity as buyers/
users of goods/services. A legitimate interest is
assumed for undertakings or associations which
are operating in the relevant market concerned or
whose interests are capable of being directly and
adversely affected by the conduct complained of.
The Commission may verify whether this requirement is fulfilled ‘‘at any stage of the investigation’’.
Assessment of a complaint—assessment of
‘‘Community interest’’. The Commission notes
that it is entitled to reject a complaint for lack of
Community interest (Automec II). Otherwise, one
may think that the criterion as to whether the complainant can assert his right before the national
courts is likely to have an increased importance
under the new system.
The draft Notice also emphasises that the procedural rights of complainants are less far-reaching
than those of the undertakings concerned.43 Importantly, the Commission also notes that where
it rejects a complaint, its assessment does not
definitively rule on whether Arts 81 or 82 EC are
infringed, and does not prevent NCAs or national
courts applying Arts 81 or 82 EC to such practices.
Draft Notice on guidance letters for novel
questions General. The abolition of the notification system for the application of Art.81 EC and
its replacement with the new, decentralised ‘‘directly applicable system’’ clearly affects legal certainty. Up to now, companies could notify in the
case of new business practices, or issues which
could only be assessed on the basis of analogous
principles or which overtly sought to test the limits
of the apparently applicable existing rules.
Now, companies will have to self-assess in such
cases and, in the case of Art.81(3) EC, they will have
to consider not just whether the Commission will
clear the practice, but also whether the NCAs or
national courts which may be involved will clear it.
The Commission will, however, remain central,
above all because of the confirmation of its special
role in Masterfoods I.
The draft Notice on guidance letters confirms
that the Commission may provide informal guidance in a written statement (‘‘guidance letters’’) with
regard to novel questions where it considers this appropriate and subject to its enforcement priorities.
Recently, there have been suggestions that the
Commission now envisages a more extensive role
for guidance letters than before. Previously, the
Commission was concerned not to have continued
notification and comfort letters ‘‘by the back door’’.
Perhaps the thought now is that this may be an
43. Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, British American
Tobacco and RJ Reynolds Industries v Commission
[1987] E.C.R. 249.
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important avenue for the Commission to stay in
touch with market development and, where appropriate, to start cases for Art.10 decisions on
‘‘findings of inapplicability’’.
On the face of the text, the issuing of guidance
letters will be reserved to cases presenting a ‘‘genuinely unresolved question’’, and it is finally for the
Commission to decide whether to process a request
for guidance. There is no positive commitment or
obligation to do so.
Prerequisites for the issuance of guidance letters.
The Commission will consider requests for informal guidance only where:






A case presents a question for which there is
no clarification (in the EC legal framework, in
publicly available general guidance, in case
law/decision-making practice or in previous
guidance letters);
the clarification of the novel question seems
prima facie useful, taking into account the
economic importance for the consumers, the
potential widespread character of the practice, the scope of investments and the possible effects on structural operations;
the issuing of the guidance letter does not
require further fact-finding.

The Commission will not consider a request for
informal guidance where:



Identical or similar questions are pending
before the European Courts;
the practice at stake is the subject of proceedings before the Commission, national courts
or NCAs.

Effects of the guidance letters. A guidance letter
will not bind EC Courts, national courts or NCAs.
The Commission does not consider itself bound by
guidance letters, in that it can always take a different approach in its assessment on the basis of a
complaint. However, the Commission will ‘‘normally’’ take a previous guidance letter into account
when dealing with the same facts and where there
are no new developments in the case law of the
European Courts.
It remains to be seen whether guidance letters
will be appealable acts.
Draft Guidelines on ‘‘effect of trade’’ General.
The purpose of the Guidelines is to assist NCAs
and national courts in their determination as to
whether an agreement or practice ‘‘may affect trade
between Member States’’ and thus be subject to
Art.81 EC or Art.82 EC. The draft Guidelines summarise the principles developed over the years to
provide a methodology for NCAs and national
courts to use in their examinations. (These are not
repeated here.) However, the Guidelines also go
further and establish a rule (the so-called ‘‘no



appreciable affectation of trade (NAAT) rule’’)
indicating when agreements are unlikely to be
capable of affecting trade between Member States.
This is new. In practice, to work out if a restriction is caught by EC law, the draft Guidelines also
need to be read with the parallel Notice on what is
an appreciable restriction on competition.44
Interestingly, given current debates, there is
much material on how restrictions ‘‘inherently’’ or
‘‘by their very nature’’ affect competition.
First, the Commission emphasises that the notion of ‘‘may affect’’ trade does not require an actual
effect on trade: it is sufficient if an agreement/
practice is capable of having such an effect. Thus,
there is no need to calculate the actual volume of
trade that is affected.
Community law considers certain types of agreement to be by their nature capable of having an
effect on trade, such as cross-border cartels and
agreements relating to imports/exports. In other
cases, the nature of the product can be relevant.
For example, agreements/practices concerning
products that are easily traded across borders or
that are important for entry into a market are more
readily capable of affecting trade than others.
Once an effect on cross-border trade is established, the nature of that effect is considered irrelevant. Thus, jurisdiction is established even if the
agreement/practice causes an increase in trade.
Similarly, it does not matter whether the effect on
cross-border trade is direct (generally for products
covered by the agreement/practice) or indirect
(generally for products related to those covered by
the agreement/practice, or where the agreement/
practice does not directly regulate the sale of the
covered product).
Finally, even if the agreement/practice is not
capable of affecting trade when it is implemented,
Arts 81 and 82 EC will still be applicable if effects
may occur in the future with a sufficient degree of
probability. This will be the case when the current
market/legal conditions would not allow an effect
on trade but are likely to change in the foreseeable
future.
Secondly, the draft Guidelines also state that
Arts 81 and 82 EC apply only where the agreement/practice is capable of having effects of a ‘‘certain magnitude’’. On the case law, sales amounting
to about 5 per cent of the market can be sufficient for
this purpose. For vertical agreements, the cumulative effects of parallel networks of similar agreements are also relevant. Agreements between
small and medium enterprises, on the other hand,
are presumed not to be capable of affecting trade
between Member States.
The most significant aspect of the draft Guidelines is the formulation of a general presumption,
applicable to all types of agreements, defining
44. Commission Notice on agreement of minor importance [2001] O.J. C-368/13.
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when there will be no appreciable effect on trade
between Member States (the ‘‘NAAT’’ rule).45
To invoke the presumption, two conditions
must be met:
(1) The parties must have an aggregate market
share on any affected market of not more than
5 per cent; and
(2) either the parties (in the case of horizontal
agreements) or the supplier (in the case of
vertical agreements) must have an aggregate
annual Community turnover in the products
concerned of not more than e40 million.
While the NAAT rule creates a presumption
that the agreement does not affect trade between
Member States, the Guidelines also outline an
(opposing) presumption in cases of agreements/
practices that, by their nature, are capable of affecting trade. For such agreements, where the turnover exceeds the e40 million threshold for the
NAAT rule, there is a presumption that the effects
on trade are appreciable. For other agreements,
exceeding the thresholds would not give rise to
such a presumption.
Application to various agreement. Having set
out the principles relevant to the assessment of
effect on trade, the draft Guidelines then apply
them to various types of agreement. Significant
points in this respect are as follows:










Foreclosure effects (such as from exclusive
purchasing obligations) in relation to vertical
agreements may limit trade between Member
States.
When assessing the appreciability of an effect
on trade caused by either exploitative or
exclusionary abuses under Art.82 EC, the
very existence of the dominant position implies that competition is already weakened
and the ability of conduct that further
weakens competition to affect trade is normally appreciable.
Sector-wide standardisation or certification
regimes that are more difficult for competitors in other Member States to fulfil normally
have an effect on trade.
Where a regional market only is affected, the
volume of sales affected must be significant
in comparison to the overall volume of sales
in the Member State. Agreements that cover
areas with a high concentration of demand
are therefore more likely to have an effect on
trade between Member States than those in
other areas.
Trade is also capable of being affected when
infrastructures such as airports and ports
(important for providing cross-border services) are affected.
45. Paras 50–57.

DraftGuidelinesontheapplicationofArticle81(3)EC
General. The aim of the draft Guidelines is to build
on and provide more detailed guidance than that
contained in the current Guidelines on vertical
restraints and horizontal agreements in order for
companies to ‘‘self-assess’’ agreements, and NCAs
and national courts to apply Art.81(3) EC. This is
new, important and explicitly economic.
Basic principles of Art.81(1) EC. Before the
Guidelines examine the criteria for the application
of Art.81(3) EC, they set out briefly the principles of
Art.81(1) EC.
Agreements/practices which have the object of
restricting competition, such as price-fixing or
market-sharing (for horizontal agreements) and
resale price maintenance or absolute territorial protection (for vertical agreements), are presumed to
have negative effects on competition and come
within the scope of Art.81(1) EC without the need
to demonstrate actual effects on the market. For
other agreements/practices, sufficient negative
effects on competition must be shown. Such effects
are likely to occur when at least one of the parties
obtains some degree of market power, albeit of
a lower level than would be necessary for the
application of Art.82 EC.
To assess whether an agreement is restrictive of
competition because of its effects on the market, the
Guidelines propose two questions46:
(1) Does the agreement restrict the competition
(actual or potential) that would have existed
‘‘in the absence of the agreement’’?
(2) Does the agreement restrict the competition
(actual or potential) that would have existed
‘‘in the absence of the alleged restriction of
competition’’?
According to the Guidelines, the second question
relates to the issue of whether the restriction is objectively necessary for the conclusion of the agreement.
The Commission also provides guidance on the
treatment of ancillary restraints (alleged restrictions of competition which are directly related
and necessary to the implementation of a nonrestrictive transaction and are proportionate to it).
The Commission specifically points out that the
application of the ancillary restraint concept does
not involve any weighing of pro-competitive and
anti-competitive effects, such balancing being
reserved for Art.81(3) EC.
This discussion is interesting, but not entirely
clear, as we consider when restrictions are outside
Art.81(1) EC or capable of being cleared under
Art.81(3) EC (which may be significant for the burden of proof). It should be noted, however, that
the Court’s case law and previous Commission
practice is also perhaps not that clear. Recently, in
Metropole and Masterfoods II, the European Court
46. Para.24.



[2004] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 2 c SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]

http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art37

RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2002–03 (PART 1): [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 31

has emphasised that economic assessments are in
Art.81(3) EC only.
Basic principles of Art.81(3) EC. A number of
general principles are relevant to Art.81(3) EC as a
whole:











The Guidelines stress that Art.81(3) EC applies
to any and all agreements that come within
the scope of Art.81(1) EC, even those involving so-called ‘‘hardcore’’ restrictions (pricefixing, output limitation, market-sharing, etc.).
Art.81(3) EC can be applied individually or
through the block exemptions (which remain
in force under the new regime).
The four conditions of Art.81(3) EC are
exhaustive.
As a general matter, restrictions in one market
or area cannot be offset by efficiencies and
consumer benefits in another. However, such
benefits will be relevant in relation to closely
interrelated markets.
The benefit of Art.81(3) EC lasts only as long
as the conditions are met. If the facts relied
on change materially, the exception under
Art.81(3) EC no longer applies. (Another controversial change with the new system, since
before, when exemption was granted it was for
a defined period, for which there was greater
certainty as to competition compliance.)
However, the Commission states that where
the agreement is an irreversible event, such
as the withdrawal from a research project,
Art.81(3) EC remains applicable even if
future events change the market conditions.

The draft Guidelines examine each condition of
Art.81(3) EC individually, although not in the order
in which they appear. Each of the four conditions
must be met in order for Art.81(3) EC to save a
restriction.
First condition—efficiency gains. Objective efficiencies only can be taken into account, meaning that
cost savings arising from the exercise of market power
will not be relevant. The efficiencies must result
from the economic activity which forms the object
of the agreement, and they must be substantiated.
To substantiate efficiencies, companies must
provide verifiable data on the nature of the efficiencies, the link to the agreement, the likelihood
and magnitude of the efficiencies, how and when
they will be achieved, and the cost of any efficiencies. The latter is relevant because Art.81(3)
EC counts only net efficiencies.
The Guidelines provide a number of examples of
efficiencies (which are not intended to be exhaustive).47 In general, these examples are not controversial. They include:


cost efficiencies from the development of
new technologies or production methods;
47. Paras 51–63.






synergies from the integration of existing
assets;
economies of scale, such as combination of
logistics operations;
economies of scope, such as distribution of
similar products together; and
efficiencies from better planning, inventory
reduction and increased capacity utilisation.

However, some efficiencies listed by the Guidelines may prove harder to substantiate, namely
‘‘learning efficiencies’’ arising from expertise gained
by focusing on a particular process or task. The
Guidelines also refer to efficiencies in the form
of technical and technological advances through
joint research and development or joint production
and improvements in product quality and service levels, such as those arising from specialised
distribution.
There is no discussion of environmental gains,
which one might have expected after the recent
changes to the EC Treaty and recent Commission
practice.48 One senses that such considerations are
to be dealt with mainly in the application of
Art.81(1) EC, and that the Commission (and the
Court) would prefer Art.81(3) EC to remain essentially economic.
Third condition—indispensability of the restrictions. This condition has two parts.
First, there must be no other practicable and less
restrictive means to achieve the claimed efficiencies.
For example, companies claiming economies of
scale or scope will have to substantiate why
internal growth and price competition would not
have achieved the same result. A key factor for
companies will be to determine the minimum
efficient scale on the market, i.e. the level of output
necessary to minimise average cost and exhaust
economies of scale. The larger the minimum
efficient scale, the more likely that efficiencies
will be specific to the agreement. Certain types of
efficiencies, namely synergies through the combination of complementary assets/capabilities,
are presumed to be specific to the agreement.
Secondly, it must be shown that the efficiencies
would be eliminated or significantly reduced without the restrictions. The greater the restriction, the
stricter the test. On the other hand, where the
success of a product is uncertain, greater restrictions may be necessary to ensure that the efficiencies will materialise. Similarly, substantial
sunk investments are more likely to justify strict
restrictions. If a restriction is indispensable only for
a certain period, the exception in Art.81(3) EC will
apply only for that period.
Second condition—fair share for consumers.
The draft Guidelines specify that this implies that
the pass-on of benefits at least compensates for

48. e.g. the recent CECED line of cases.
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the actual or likely negative consequences of the
agreement, so that the net effect of the overall agreement is neutral from a consumer viewpoint.
The draft Guidelines highlight a number of factors that could have a negative effect on any pass-on
of benefits in an elaborate and newly explicit way:








A time lag between implementation of the
agreement and materialisation of the efficiencies will reduce the value of the efficiencies for consumers. The draft Guidelines
therefore state that the value of future gains
must be ‘‘discounted’’ by applying an appropriate discount rate. (However, they do not
provide any guidance on what such a rate
could be in any given situation.)
Where an agreement gives companies the
ability to achieve efficiencies early (‘‘lead
time’’), the draft Guidelines state that any
likely negative impact on consumers following this lead time has to be taken into account.
The concern of the Guidelines is that the
agreement could lead to a strong market position and thus the ability to charge a higher
price, and that the efficiencies would not
fully compensate.
In a similar vein, the draft Guidelines highlight that competition is an important longterm driver of efficiency and that the impact
of the agreement on such competition must
be weighed against the efficiencies created by
the agreement. Interestingly, the draft Guidelines here refer to dominant firms as firms
that may have less incentive to maintain or
build on efficiencies because of a lack of
competitive restraint.49
The fact that efficiency gains may not affect
the entire cost structure of the company must
be taken into account. Thus, a 6 per cent
reduction in production costs will count as
only a 2 per cent benefit to consumers if
production costs make up one-third of the
costs on which prices are determined.

In assessing the pass-on of benefits to consumers, the draft Guidelines highlight that passon is likely to occur where cost efficiencies allow
companies to expand output and increase profit.
Where capacity constraints exist, pass-on is likely
to take longer. Markets subject to tacit collusion are
also likely to experience slower pass-on, although
in some cases the efficiencies may be enough to turn
a smaller player into a ‘‘maverick’’ to challenge the
oligopoly.
The key element in reviewing the likelihood of
consumer pass-on is that the pricing decisions of
companies are determined by variable, as opposed
to fixed, costs. Therefore, consumer pass-on is more
likely when the cost efficiencies allow reductions

in variable costs. Once it is determined that consumer pass-on is likely, the rate of such pass-on will
depend on the price elasticity of demand (the extent
to which demand is responsive to a decrease in
price). The higher the price elasticity of demand,
the greater the pass-on rate.
The draft Guidelines recognise that non-cost
efficiencies (for example, efficiencies resulting in
new and improved products) are harder to assess
quantitatively and require a certain value judgment. According to the Guidelines, once the value
stemming from any improvements to consumers
outweighs any harm from an increase in prices
stemming from the agreement, then the test will
be fulfilled.
Fourth condition—no elimination of competition. The draft Guidelines reiterate that competition is an essential driver of economic efficiency.
Therefore, the ultimate aim of Art.81 EC is to
protect the competitive process in the long term
as well as the short term. To this end, protection
of the long-term competitive structure is to be
given priority over potentially pro-competitive
efficiency gains that could result in the short
term.50 The draft Guidelines do not give an indication of what period would be sufficient to qualify
as ‘‘long term’’.
Interestingly,the Commission states that Art.81(3)
EC has to be interpreted consistently with Art.82
EC, so that it would prevent the exemption of a
restrictive agreement that constitutes an abuse of
a dominant position (but not just the creation of a
dominant position).51 However, the Commission
emphasises that not all restrictive agreements
concluded by dominant companies amount to an
abuse. An individual examination may therefore be
necessary to determine if such agreements could be
objectively justified.
The factors in any examination under the fourth
condition are the degree of competition prior to the
agreement and the impact of the agreement on that
competition. Both actual and potential competition are relevant. For actual competition, market
share, capacity restraints and costs of production
will have to be assessed, as will evidence of past
competitive interaction. The assessment of potential competition requires entry barriers to be
assessed. This requires an evaluation of regulatory
barriers, sunk costs of entry, the minimum efficient
scale of the industry and the likely response of
current players, among other factors.
This is interesting material. One may think that
encouraging specialised national courts to deal
with such issues is essential, if they are to be dealt
with effectively! It may also be encouraging for
dominant companies.

50. Para.93.
51. Para.95.

49. Para.80.
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European Court cases (ECJ and CFI)

Other
On September 30, 2003, the Commission also
published a draft amendment to the Liner
Consortia Block Exemption Reg.823/200052 (‘‘the
LCBE’’). This is only intended to apply from May
1, 2004 until April 25, 2005, when the LCBE is due
for renewal in any event. What the proposed
amendment does is to align the LCBE with Reg.1/
2003, by:
(1) abolishing the ‘‘opposition procedure’’,
whereby a consortium with market share
between 30–35 per cent (depending on the
circumstances) and 50 per cent could be
notified to the Commission and come within
the LCBE, if not opposed by the Commission
within six months; and
(2) abolishing the ability for a consortium with
market share above 50 per cent to be notified
to the Commission for individual exemption
after May 1, 2004.
Instead, Reg.823/2000 will provide that consortia, claiming the benefit of the LCBE Regulation,
must be able, on not less than one month’s notice, to
demonstrate to the Commission or NCA that the
relevant conditions for exemption in the LCBE are
met, and submit the consortium agreement in question. The Commission also indicates that the Commission or the NCAs can withdraw the benefit of
the LCBE, in line with Reg.1/2003.
In February 2003, the Commission adopted a
Proposal for a Council Regulation amending
existing regulations in the air transport sector in
order to give the Commission clearer statutory
enforcement powers for air transport between the
European Union and third countries, and the
related right to grant block exemptions if appropriate.53 In recent years, the main transatlantic
alliance cases have been handled without such a
procedural power basis, in co-operation with Member States directly concerned. The Commission’s
idea is that its powers in this field should be
covered by Reg.1/2003. This is not new and still
highly controversial.54
In February and July 2003, the Commission also
adopted recommendations in relation to the
Framework Directive for electronic communications networks and services on product and service markets susceptible to ex ante regulation and
notifications, time limits, and consultations provided for in that Directive.

52. C-233/8, September 30, 2003.
53. IP/03/284, February 26, 2003; COM (2003) 91 final,
February 24, 2003.
54. [2003] O.J. L114/45 and [2003] O.J. L190/13.



Table 4: Main European Court Cases:
— Michelin:
 fidelity rebates law reaffirmed;
 ‘‘object and effect’’ intertwined in Art.82 EC?
 transparency not key;
 reinforcing ‘‘spontaneous demand’’ through a
rebate unlawful;
— The Italian Matches Case:
 NCAs can disapply national laws contrary to Arts
10 and 81 EC;
 but no fine ... unless future conduct;
— Lysine appeals:
 confirmation of wide Commission discretion.
Is deterrence really fair?
— Masterfoods:
 Commission foreclosure approach to freezer
exclusivity upheld;
 no rule of reason in Art.81(1) EC;
 standard practice not enough.

Michelin
On September 30, 2003, in Michelin v Commission,55 the European Court of First Instance
(‘‘CFI’’) gave its judgment in the appeal against the
Commission’s decision imposing on Michelin a
e19.76 million fine for having applied fidelity
rebates to its dealers in truck and heavy vehicle
new-replacement tyres and retreads.56 Michelin’s
arguments were rejected and the Commission’s
decision upheld.
In the process, the Court made a number of
important clarifications to the existing case law
on fidelity rebates.
First, and in general, the Court applied what it
repeatedly emphasised was ‘‘settled case law’’ on
fidelity rebates under Art.82 EC, based on the first
Michelin judgment,57 the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment58 and other similar cases.59 This case law
establishes the unlawfulness of rebate systems
practised by dominant companies which put great
pressure on resellers not to buy from other suppliers and which cannot be shown to be strictly
cost-justified.
Specifically, the Court had to consider the
Michelin rebate systems, where the rebates increased
according to the reseller’s sales turnover, in a scale
with many steps (some 47 to 54 steps in one form,
and 18 in another). One scale concerned sales turnover in all types of tyre (save for two), and two scales
dealt with these excepted types. The scales had a
reference period of one year. The Court held that
these rebate systems constituted fidelity rebates
because they applied to the reseller’s entire sales
55. Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, September 30, 2003.
56. [2002] O.J. L143/1.
57. Case 322/81, NV Nederlandse Banden-Industrie
Michelin v Commission [1983] E.C.R. 3461.
58. Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461.
59. Paras 54–60.
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turnover with Michelin and had this length of reference period.
As regards the length of the reference period of
the rebate, the Court confirmed that, contrary to the
position taken by the Commission in its decision,
the European Courts had never ruled that the reference period could not be more than three months.
However, the Court emphasised that the loyaltyinducing character of a system based on total turnover achieved increased in proportion to the length
of reference period.60
As regards the loyalty effect of a total turnover
system, the Court compared the small gain to the
reseller if an additional rebate were only applied on
the amount of sales turnover above a threshold in
order to move a single step to the next threshold in
the scale, with the much higher gain to the reseller if
the additional rebate were applied to the reseller’s
total sales turnover.61
The Court noted that if these quantity rebates
were based on a clear economic return, then they
could be objectively justified and lawful. However,
the Court emphasised that specific proven economies (such as of scale) were required. Since Michelin
had only provided general statements to this effect,
these were not established.
Importantly, the Court also made it clear that a
system of fidelity rebates is contrary to Art.82 EC
‘‘whether or not it is transparent’’.62 Many had
argued since the first Michelin case that the transparency of the mechanism of the rebates applied by
a dominant firm was key to its justification under
Art.82 EC. The Court found on the facts that the
Michelin system ‘‘was complex’’ and ‘‘made it impossible for the resellers to assess the true price of
the tyres at the moment of purchase’’.
Secondly, the Court considered whether
Michelin’s ‘‘service rebate’’ was lawful and found
that it was not. This was a system giving points to
resellers if they carried out various tasks. If enough
points were achieved, a rebate was granted. Broadly,
the Commission objected to the system, on the basis
that it involved subjective elements and left a margin of discretion to Michelin as to whether it would
award points and therefore rebates. For example,
points were awarded if a reseller contributed ‘‘positively’’ to the launch of new Michelin products. The
Court agreed with the Commission that this was too
vague and therefore unfair and abusive: rebates by
dominant companies had to be based on an objective economic justification.
Thirdly, the Court considered whether the socalled ‘‘friends of Michelin’’ co-operation club with
large distributors was abusive, and found that it
was. The Commission’s objection to this club was

60. Para.85.
61. Paras 87–88.
62. Para.111.

that it was used by Michelin to crystallise or improve its market share, giving Michelin exceptional
insight into the activities of its members and requiring members to use Michelin for the first retread of
Michelin tyres.
The Court agreed, noting that access to the club
was conditional on an obligation to achieve a market share or ‘‘temperature’’ with Michelin (share of
sales in Michelin products). Members of the club
were further required to hold a sufficient stock of
Michelin products to meet demand immediately.
Obligations to ‘‘put forward’’ the Michelin brand
and not to turn ‘‘spontaneous demand’’ for
Michelin products to other products also served
to crystallise, if not improve, Michelin’s market
position. This is another controversial finding,
since many companies think it fair to say to a customer: ‘‘Do not turn customers to other products if
they ask for mine.’’ The Commission’s view, confirmed by the Court, is that a dominant company
cannot pay rebates to induce distributors to respect
such ‘‘fair play’’.
The Court also found that the information which
the resellers had to give Michelin went too far,
allowing Michelin too much control over its distribution. Indeed, the Court noted that the information requirements made it impossible for the
club’s members to increase their business with
Michelin’s competitors without Michelin knowing
about it.
Finally, the Court held that the obligation on
resellers to give Michelin the first retread business
on their tyres abusively barred access to the retread
market.
Interestingly, Michelin also argued that the
Commission was obliged to show concrete effects
flowing from the practices in question for there to be
an abuse. The Court disagreed. Abusive conduct
had only to tend to restrict competition or, in other
words, the conduct had to be of a nature or capable
of having such an effect.63 If the object of restricting
competition were shown, the conduct is considered capable of having such an effect, and that
is enough. The Court also noted that, in the AKZO
predatory pricing case, no proof of concrete effects
had been required. Pricing below average variable
cost was considered per se abusive.
On the whole, the judgment is an orthodox application of settled case law.64 However, it is a source of
much controversy already, since it brings disappointment for practitioners, economists and dominant companies who continue to find it difficult
that dominant companies are prevented from competing, as they see it, ‘‘normally’’ with their smaller
rivals, with the same type of rebates that they use

63. Para.239.
64. With thanks to Frédéric Louis and Anne Vallery for
their assistance with this section.
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(while accepting that their pricing must be above
average total costs).
This is particularly so in view of the fact that
rebates normally do not just follow a strict costrelated structure. They usually reflect also history
and competition. Forcing dominant firms to find
only strict cost justifications for their rebates, involving minute and complex appreciations and
resulting in rebates which are less attractive than
non cost-justified competing offers by the nondominant, is therefore not popular with the
dominant.
It also remains an open question how strict the
economic justification must be, if all the obvious
‘‘red flags’’ as to prohibited forms of rebate in the
Court’s case law are observed. The Court appears to
underline that the cost justification should be clear.
In practice, the Commission has brought relatively
few cases, usually where there were many clear
aspects to the abuse.
On the other hand, many will be pleased to see
that the ‘‘three-month reference period rule’’ is just
the Commission’s proposed safe harbour, and not
accepted as such by the Court as an obvious ‘‘red
flag’’. Longer reference periods may be allowed
depending on the circumstances.
The statement that there is no need to demonstrate anti-competitive effect for a finding of abuse
when there is an anti-competitive object is highly
topical, given new debate on the reform of Art.82
EC. The Court actually says that the demonstration
of the ‘‘object and anti-competitive effect’’ are
mixed together in the context of Art.82 EC.65
Again, many will be disappointed, arguing that
if, for example, a dominant company were losing
market share, the per se rule is wrong, and just
condemns the ‘‘dominant’’ to an unfairly high standard for rebates, until they are no longer dominant.
Equally, that an unlawful and unproven exclusionary object should not be inferred from a normal
and legitimate desire to sell more and, in that sense,
induce loyalty.
The question as to how to reward services also
remains a difficult issue. A checklist of simple
things done, meriting a rebate, appears a lawful
approach, but services are often assessed more in
terms of quality, and this is not so easy to judge.
Qualitative assessments are high risk, because they
are likely to be considered subjective.
In general, the Michelin judgment requires careful evaluation. One can argue, as happened with
Michelin I, that the circumstances were exceptional
and therefore try to distance the ruling from other
cases. One would note here, for example, the way
that the Court wraps up its ruling on reseller pressure in all the elements of the case as if to say that the
overall equity in this case was against the Michelin
system. Another element which may have weighed
65. Para.241.



with the Court was that, apparently, Michelin list
prices were so high that dealers were forced to sell
their tyres at a loss, until account was taken of the
rebates they were entitled to under the Michelin
scheme.
However, one can also argue that the Court has
chosen to favour a broad per se rule approach,
focusing on preserving residual competition in a
market weakened by a dominant participant, and
preferring a ‘‘bright line’’ rule over more complex,
effect-based rules.
This is all highly topical and controversial. It
will be interesting to see what happens next with
Coca-Cola’s proceedings in the Commission, possible Art.82 EC Commission Guidelines as it considers modernisation in this field,66 and Virgin/
British Airways,67 another case on fidelity rebates
at the European Court.
The Italian Matches Case
In September 2003, the ECJ gave an important
judgment on state action and EC competition law
in the context of the supply of matches in Italy.68
The case arose on a reference from the Regional
Administrative Court, Lazio. The Italian Competition Authority (‘‘ICA’’) had taken a decision
against a form of commercial monopoly which
had been conferred by the Italian state on a consortium of Italian match manufacturers (‘‘CIF’’). The
monopoly was long-standing, dating from 1923,
and had been amended through a judgment of the
Italian Constitutional Court and subsequent decrees in 1983, 1992 and 1993. The ICA had concerns
about:
(1) Whether the CIF, as amended, infringed
competition law;
(2) agreements between the CIF and an organisation called the ‘‘Conaedi’’, which represented wholesalers of monopoly goods; and
(3) an agreement between Swedish Match and
the CIF.
Interestingly, in doing so the ICA was applying
(what was then) Art.81(1) EC, rather than Italian
competition law.
In what appears to have been a ground-breaking
initiative, the ICA found in 2000 that:
(1) to the extent that Italian law had required
participation in the CIF, it had provided a
66. See also the papers by Luc Gyselen, ‘‘Rebates: competition on the merits or exclusionary practice?’’,
published on the European Commission website; the other
papers at the proceedings of the European University Institute, Florence, 2003, What is an Abuse of Dominant Position (Ehlermann and Atanasiu eds); and ‘‘Roundtable on
loyalty or fidelity discounts and rebates’’ (OECD, May
2002).
67. [2000] O.J. L30/1.
68. Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Flammifieri v
Autorità Garante della Concerronza e del Mercato,
Judgment of September 9, 2003.
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‘‘legal shield’’ to conduct which would
otherwise have been prohibited (this concerned the monopoly until 1993);
(2) the legislative framework had to be disapplied by any court or public administration, such as the ICA, since it was
contrary to Arts 3(i)(g), 10 and 81(1) EC; and
(3) disapplication would imply removal of the
legal shield.
Furthermore, some of the activities of the CIF were
not required by the legal framework of the Italian
law, notably the allocation of production quotas in
a related committee, the majority of which was
constituted by producers.
The ICA noted that since 1994, participation in
the CIF had no longer been compulsory for the
production and marketing of matches in Italy, and
that membership of the CIF had become voluntary.
As a result, the conduct of the member companies
had to be regarded, from 1994 onwards, as the result
of autonomous economic decisions, for which they
were responsible.
Finally, the two agreements, with the wholesalers and with Swedish Match, were also contrary
to Art.81(1) EC. The former gave the CIF exclusive
control of the commercial channel of wholesale
distribution. The latter, whereby the CIF bought
a certain amount of matches from its principal
European competitor, prevented Swedish Match
from selling directly in Italy.
On appeal to the Lazio Court, the main issue was
whether the ICA was competent to disapply Italian
law in this way. The Italian Court was also not sure
whether there was room for significant competition
between the members of CIF, prices for matches
still being set by the state. In such a system, did
quota allocation matter? Was autonomous conduct
which restricted competition precluded? The Court
referred these issues to the ECJ.
In an equally ground-breaking judgment, the ECJ
upheld the ICA’s position. A national competition
authority could not effectively ensure that Art.81
EC is observed, if such an authority could not
declare a national measure contrary to Arts 10 and
81 EC and, as a result, be able to disapply it.69
However, in such a case the undertakings concerned were still entitled to plead the national law
as a defence against any penalties, whether criminal or administrative, in respect of past conduct
required by the law concerned. The decision to
disapply the law concerned did ‘‘not alter the fact
that the law set the framework for the undertakings’
past conduct’’. It was still a legal ‘‘shield’’ for public
authorities and other economic operators. Going
forward, however, once the law was disapplied, the
undertakings concerned could be penalised for
their future conduct.70
69. Paras 50–51.
70. Paras 52–55.



If national law merely encouraged or made it
easier for undertakings to engage in autonomous
anti-competitive conduct, those undertakings could
still be penalised for infringements before the law
was disapplied. In the present context, however, the
nationallegal framework could be a mitigating factor.
As regards the question whether competition
could be distorted in the circumstances, the ECJ
left that to the national court to determine, while
making it clear that, in principle, the residual competition possible, other than on price, could be
appreciable, and therefore a restriction of such
competition could be caught by Art.81(1) EC.
The Commission has already picked up on the
case, as a new facet to its campaign for competition
in services (where professional rules may be set in
laws).
Lysine appeals71
In July 2003, the CFI ruled on four appeals, brought
by Archer Daniels Midland (‘‘ADM’’), Kyowa Hakko
Kogyo, Daesang-Sewon and Cheil Jedang, against
the Commission’s lysine (amino acids) cartel decision72 in which the Commission had fined the four
companies a total of e81.6 million.73 The CFI reduced
the fines to a total of e74.3 million.
It may be recalled that lysine is an amino acid and
is used in animal feed. Nutritionists add synthetic
lysine to feedstuff like cereals or soybeans in order
to formulate protein-based diets for animals.
The case started when the American authorities
discovered in 1995 that ADM, Kyowa, Sewon Corp,
Cheil Corp and Ajinomoto Co Inc had formed a
cartel to fix lysine prices and to allocate sales of
lysine. In the US, the companies were fined and
three executives of ADM were sentenced to prison.
In July 1996, Ajinomoto came to the Commission
on the basis of the 1996 Leniency Notice,74 offering
to co-operate in proving the existence of a cartel in
the lysine market and its effects in the European
Economic Area (‘‘EEA’’). In June 1997, the Commission ‘‘dawn-raided’’ the European premises of
ADM and Kyowa Europe, and in June 2001, the
Commission issued a decision charging the companies with fixing lysine prices and sales quotas in
the EEA and with exchanging information on their
sales volumes.
In the decision, the Commission used the 1998
Fining Guidelines75 and the 1996 Leniency Notice
71. With thanks to Natalie McNelis for her assistance
with this section.
72. Case T-220/00, Cheil Jedang Corp v Commission
(‘‘Cheil’’); Case T-223/00, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co Ltd
GmbH v Commission; Case T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland Co Ltd v Commission; Case T-230/00, Daesang Corp
and Sewon Europe GmbH v Commission, Judgments of July
9, 2003.
73. [2001] O.J. L152/24.
74. [1996] O.J. C207/p.4.
75. Guidelines for calculating fines imposed pursuant to
Art.15(2) of Regulation 17 and Art.65(5) of the ECSC
Treaty, O.J. 1998 C9, p.3.
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to calculate the fines. The applicants appealed the
decision in August 2000, raising various pleas for
its full-scale annulment or, at least, a reduction of
the fine.
It may be useful to focus on certain facets of the
judgments dealing with the Commission’s calculation of the fines.
First, the applicants argued that, recently, the
Commission has been imposing fines at a level that
a few years ago no one would have thought possible.
Notably, the applicants argued that the Commission should not have used the 1998 Fining Guidelines in this case because the cartel was brought to
an end before the Guidelines were published. The
applicants relied on principles such as breach of
legitimate expectations, legal certainty, non-retroactive application of penalties and equal treatment.76 The Court rejected them all, saying that
use of the Guidelines amounted to a mere change
in the administrative practice of the Commission
which did not amount to an alteration of the
existing legal framework for determining fines (set
out in Art.15 of Reg.17).77
Secondly, the applicants argued the ‘‘non bis in
idem’’ principle, that a second penalty may not be
imposed on the same person for the same offence.
As mentioned above, the US (and the Canadian
authorities) had already imposed fines on the
same companies for the same cartel. One of the
issues before the CFI was whether, when calculating the fine in worldwide cartels, the Commission
has to take into account fines previously imposed in
non-EEA jurisdictions.
The answer was ‘‘no’’. The CFI ruled that the
Commission has no obligation to take into account
fines imposed in non-EEA countries. According to
the Court, an undertaking may be penalised in more
than one jurisdiction for the same infringement
when the penalties pursue different objectives.
Here the Commission fines aim to preserve competition in the European Union, while those of the
other jurisdictions aim to preserve competition in
their respective markets. Thus, there was no breach
of the non bis in idem principle.78
Thirdly, the Court stressed in this case that if the
Commission proposes to impose a fine, then it has
to assess the gravity of the infringement, and in
doing so the Commission is required to assess the
actual impact of the cartel ‘‘in cases where it appears that this can be measured’’.79 According to the
Court, the Commission’s point of reference is the
competition that would normally have existed if
there had been no infringement.80
76. All four judgments are similar, though not identical.
All references here are to the ADM case, unless otherwise
indicated. Para.23 et seq.
77. Paras 39–75.
78. Paras 85–104.
79. Para.143.
80. That is, ‘‘prices would not have developed in the same
way as the prices which were actually charged’’: para.152.



Fourthly, the Court held that the Commission
should have looked at the turnover in the market
affected by the infringement, the EEA lysine market, rather than worldwide turnover, as a measure
of the scale of the infringement committed by each
company.81 Citing Parker Pen,82 ADM had argued
that its fine—which exceeded its turnover in the
EEA lysine market in the last year of the infringement—was disproportionate.83
In spite of this, the Court did not consider that
the fine was overall unreasonable.84 In coming
to that conclusion, the Court seems to have been
influenced by the fact that ADM’s EEA sales of
lysine were a significant proportion of its worldwide turnover.85
The Court said that total turnover can still come
into play with regard to deterrence. There, the Court
said that the Commission is entitled to take total
worldwide turnover into account, because that figure gives an indication of the overall size of the
undertaking and its economic power. This is considered relevant to determining the amount of the
fine that will deter it from infringing in the future.86
As in the Pre-insulated Pipe Cases, this must
now be very disturbing for large multinationals. Is it
really fair? Above all, why should multinational
conglomerates be fined more just because they are
built that way? One may well argue that fine levels
should be adjusted in relation to involvement in
infringements and markets affected, not just because companies are big or small. If groups are
penalised twice, they can still be sanctioned more
for recidivism, but huge fines for deterrence are a
concern.
Finally, the Court was generally demanding in
reviewing the equal treatment of those fined and the
related reasoning. For example, in the Cheil case,
the Court did not accept that the Commission
increased the fine on certain companies something
less than 10 per cent per year of duration, while it
increased Cheil’s fine something more than 10 per
cent per year. The Court consequently reduced
Cheil’s fine.87
Masterfoods88
In October 2003, the CFI upheld the Commission’s
decision in the Irish ice-cream case known as
‘‘Masterfoods’’.89 The Commission had found that
81. Paras 193–197.
82. Case T-77/92, Parker Pen v Commission [1994] E.C.R.
II-549.
83. Paras 173–176.
84. Para.200. The Court noted that the ‘‘10% of worldwide turnover’’ ceiling of Art.15(2) Reg.17 is the ultimate
measure for the proportionality of the file.
85. Para.205.
86. See also, generally, Cheil, paras 76–103.
87. Cheil, para.139.
88. With thanks to Anne Vallery and Naboth Van den
Broeck for their assistance with this section.
89. Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission,
Judgment of October 23, 2003; Court Press Release 93/03.
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Van den Bergh (a Unilever subsidiary) infringed
Arts 81 and 82 EC by supplying freezer cabinets for
impulse ice-cream with the condition that they
were not to be used for competing ice-cream
products.
It may be recalled that Van den Bergh (formerly
HB Ice Cream Ltd, ‘‘HB’’) is the leading manufacturer of impulse ice-cream products (‘‘singlewrapped ice-creams for immediate consumption’’)
in Ireland. For some time, retailers had been supplied with freezer cabinets, in which HB retained
ownership, for no direct charge, provided that they
were used exclusively for stocking and displaying
HB ice-cream products. In a sense, HB had created
the ice-cream market in this way, by providing
storage opportunities for its products, and it had
been very sucessful.
In 1989, Masterfoods Ltd (a subsidiary of Mars
Inc, ‘‘Mars’’) entered the Irish ice-cream market.
Some Irish retailers started to place Masterfoods’
products in their HB freezers, which led HB to
enforce the exclusivity provision in its distribution
agreements. Masterfoods then brought an action
in the Irish High Court, claiming that the HB
exclusivity clause infringed (what were then) Arts
85 and 86 EC. In May 1992, the Irish High Court
found for HB, and, in September 1992, Mars appealed against this judgment to the Irish Supreme
Court.
Masterfoods also lodged a parallel complaint
with the European Commission, as did Valley Ice
Cream Ltd. In 1998, after a first set of negotiations
and a settlement, the Commission pursued its proceedings again and decided that HB’s distribution
arrangements infringed Arts 85 and 86 EC. The
Commission also required HB to lift the freezer
exclusivity imposed on the retailers for outlets
where owning a freezer or taking a second freezer
from a competitor was not an option.90
HB appealed (and obtained suspension of the
Commission’s decision). This judgment relates to
that appeal.
As a result of the Commission’s decision, the
Irish Supreme Court decided to stay proceedings
and to refer questions to the ECJ, resulting in the
landmark Masterfoods I ruling. The ECJ held there
that where a national court is considering issues
that are already subject to a Commission decision,
the Court may not reach a judgment which conflicts
with that decision, irrespective of the fact that the
Commission decision in question had been appealed to the CFI.
In HB’s appeal before the CFI, the main issue was
foreclosure under Art.81(1) EC.
HB argued that the Commission had overestimated the degree of foreclosure on the relevant
market resulting from its distribution agreements
with retailers. Notably, HB pointed out that its

distribution agreements did not involve outlet
exclusivity; they merely prevented retailers from
using the freezer cabinets provided to them by
HB‘‘free of charge’’ for competing ice-cream products. Retailers were free to install another freezer,
paid for by them or supplied by another ice-cream
supplier.
The Court accepted this to some extent, noting
that the freezer exclusivity clause did not entail, ‘‘in
formal terms, an exclusive purchasing obligation
whose object is to restrict competition’’.91 However,
the Court went on to look at the overall circumstances to see if, in fact,the freezer exclusivity
resulted in outlet exclusivity and, if so, whether
the Commission had correctly quantified the degree of foreclosure brought about by these clauses.
Thus, the Court took into consideration all the
similar agreements entered into by Van den Bergh
and its competitors, as well as the economic and
legal context on the market.
On this approach, the Court essentially confirmed the Commission’s decision. In other words,
the Court considered points such as: the fact that
HB had held a dominant position on the market for
impulse ice-cream in Ireland for a long time; the
high degree of recognition of the HB brand; HB’s
product range in Ireland; and the fact that freezers
were provided without charge. The Court found
that retailers were generally space-constrained,
and that the outlets which are the most important
for the sale of impulse ice-cream are generally small
in surface and have little available space for an
additional freezer.
The Court also noted that retailers had only
rarely opted to replace freezer cabinets supplied
by HB (even though the agreements could be
terminated at any time with two months’ notice).
In practice, it appeared that such agreements lasted
a long time, on average eight years.
The Court also found that there was customer
demand for competing ice-cream brands. This was
evidenced by the way that Masterfoods had achieved
a numeric distribution of some 42 per cent before
HB reacted to enforce its freezer exclusivity clause,
resulting in a fall to 20 per cent. Other competitors
had also obtained a high share in supermarket sales
in Ireland, while only achieving a low figure in
retailers.92
The Court concluded that the Commission had
rightly found foreclosure in all the circumstances.
HB’s system was found to have had a considerable
dissuasive effect on retailers with regard to the
installation of their own freezer cabinet or that of
another manufacturer, and this had ‘‘tied’’ some
40 per cent of sales outlets.93
HB also argued that there was a (balancing) ‘‘rule
of reason’’ in Art.81 EC which applied here: the
91. Para.80.
92. Paras 93 and 95.
93. Para.98.

90. [1998] O.J. L-246/1.
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economic benefits of its system of freely providing
freezer cabinets outweighed any possible negative
effects that the (de facto) outlet exclusivity would
have on competition. The Court disagreed, stating
that the existence of such a rule in Community
competition law was not accepted:
‘‘It is only within the specific framework of Article
85(3) that the pro and anti-competitive aspects of a
restriction may be weighed. Article 85(3) would lose
much of its effectiveness if such an examination had
already to be carried out under Article 85(1) ...’’94

The Court also considered that the economic
advantages of the supply of freezer cabinets to
retailers were negated by the related exclusivity
clause95 and therefore agreed with the Commission
that the first condition of Art.85(3) EC (economic
progress) was not met.96
As regards the finding of an infringement of the
former Art.86 EC, the Court agreed with the Commission that HB was an unavoidable partner for
many ice-cream retailers in Ireland and that it had a
dominant position on that market.
As regards whether there was an abuse, the Court
accepted HB’s argument that the provision of
freezer cabinets on a condition of exclusivity was
a standard practice on the relevant market. However, importantly, the Court found that whereas in
a normal competitive market those agreements
would have been concluded in the interest of the
two parties and could not be prohibited as a matter
of principle, those considerations could not be
accepted without reservation on a market where,
because of the dominant position held by a trader,
competition is already restricted.97
For a dominant company to restrict 40 per cent of
outlets in this way was an abuse.98
As a result, the Court found that HB had effectively foreclosed competing ice-cream suppliers
from entering the market, contrary to both Arts 81
and 82 EC.
Finally, the Court found that the exercise of HB’s
property rights could be restricted in the circumstances, and considered that the Commission did
not infringe the principle of subsidiarity by bringing the case, in spite of the Irish proceedings, since
there were parallel issues in various other Member
States.99
A few initial comments may be made.
First, it is interesting to see this result through
foreclosure. One might have expected the Commission to bring a case like this through essential
facility doctrine (i.e. arguing that the ‘‘freezers’’
were essential in that sense). However, instead,
the case is brought on a narrow market definition
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

resulting in a finding of foreclosure. There is no
discussion of ‘‘essential facility’’, and it appears
that the Commission deliberately avoided it, probably because it involves such a high standard of
proof now. In any event, a similar substantive result
appears to have been achieved.
Secondly, this is complex litigation, since the
market information required for a good assessment
is extensive. Notably, there were three major reports focusing on distribution and foreclosure, and,
as is well known now, the case has taken (too) many
years. The decision turned on many key facts, for
example that access to the rest of the market beyond
the 40 per cent ‘‘tied’’ share was also restricted. One
would think that in other cases, an exclusivity of
supply of 40 per cent might be accepted, if justified
for particular supply or production reasons. As
already noted, market definition was central. If the
market had been for ice-cream as a whole, supermarket access (which competitors had) would have
undermined the whole case.
Thirdly, one may question the result that HB will
not be allowed to offer free ice-cream freezer cabinets to retailers in exchange for exclusivity, while
its smaller rivals may be allowed to do so (not that
small really, given that some may include Mars and
Nestlé). The judgment does not appear entirely
clear on this. On the one hand, it appears that
parallel exclusive systems were considered to contribute to the overall foreclosure effect.1 On the
other, the Court appears to have found that the
other freezer exclusivity systems did not contribute
significantly to foreclosure of the relevant market.2
In any event, this underlines the difficult position for dominant companies, which apparently
cannot rely on being able to use ‘‘standard’’ practices, even though they may be ‘‘normal’’ competition, if the effect is considered abusive. The
Court’s view is that ordinary business practices
may not be ‘‘competition on the merits’’ for the
dominant—hard where the dominance in question
was apparently built up through the very creation of
the market.
TACA3
In September 2003, the CFI rendered its judgment
in the Atlantic Liner Conference Case,4 annulling
fines of e273 million which the Commission had
imposed against the members of the Trans-Atlantic
Conference Agreement (‘‘TACA’’) under Art.82 EC.
The TACA members operated shipping liner services between northern Europe and the US, and had
filed the agreement setting up the conference for
individual exemption with the Commission.
1. Paras 110–111.
2. Para.172.
3. With thanks to Axel Gutermuth for his assistance with
this section.
4. Joined cases T-191/98 and others, Atlantic Container
Line AB v Commission, Judgment of September 30, 2003;
Court Press Release 78/03.
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Para.160.
Para.198.
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The Commission refused to grant an exemption
under Art.81(3) EC, but could not impose fines for
violating Art.81 EC, because Art.19(4) of the maritime transport Reg.4056/86 excludes such fines
when an agreement was filed for exemption. However, the Commission found that the TACA members also abused their collective dominant position,
and therefore fined them.
The CFI upheld the Commission’s decision,
finding that the TACA infringed the competition
rules and the Commission’s refusal to grant an
exemption under Art.81(3) EC. The Court also upheld the Commission’s finding that the restrictions
in relation to service contracts constituted an
abuse, but set aside a second finding concerning
measures inducing competitors to join the conference for lack of evidence and infringement of the
rights of the defence.
However, the fines were set aside essentially
because of the notification and mitigating circumstances, including the co-operation of the companies and legal uncertainty over the finding of
abuse and the potential penalties.
Details of the (extensive) judgment are important
for the maritime transport industry, as it clarifies
various points of the application of EC competition
law in this area.
Three points are of more general importance.
First, the judgment holds the Commission to a
high standard of proof. In the CFI’s view, the Commission had not proved ‘‘to the requisite legal standard’’ that two shipping companies previously
competing with TACA joined the conference because they were induced to do so by the existing
TACA members. The Commission had found such
inducement to have taken place and qualified it as
an ‘‘abusive alteration of the competitive structure
of the market’’ by the collectively dominant TACA
members. The CFI found, however, that the evidence did not exclude that the two companies joined
for commercial considerations and their own interest. In doing so, the CFI effectively reconsidered the
evidence in full.5
Secondly, the CFI confirms its strict stance
against violations of the right of defence. The CFI
found that the Commission had never informed the
defendants, in the Statement of Objections or otherwise, that it intended to use certain documents to
prove a violation of Art.82 EC. Existing case law
prohibits the use of evidence under such circumstances unless the defendant could reasonably
have inferred what negative conclusions the Commission intended to draw from the evidence. Here,
the defendants themselves had submitted the
documents in question in response to Commission
requests for information which sought to determine
the applicability of Art.81(3) EC. The CFI held that
this was not sufficient to warn the defendants that
5. Paras 1268–1326.



the documents could be used to prove violations of
Art.82 EC and therefore excluded the use of these
documents.6
Thirdly, the judgment holds that under the maritime transport Regulation, the application for individual exemption under Art.81 EC shields the
applicant also from fines under Art.82 EC. This
conclusion was highly disputed before. The ruling
will, however, lose its significance with the abolition of the notification system, where immunity
from fines can no longer occur.7
Other
For reasons of space, given the amount of legislation this year, the author has had to be more
selective on cases. The other main judgments this
year were as follows:










In March 2003, the CFI gave its ruling in the
FENIN case.8 The Court found that an association of undertakings which markets medical
goods and equipment for use in Spanish hospitals did not act as an economic ‘‘undertaking’’ (and therefore was not found to have
abused a dominant position by taking a long
time to pay its debts to its members—apparently some 300 days).
In March 2003, the CFI annulled the fines
which the Commission had imposed in the
FETTCSA (Far East Trade Tariff Charges and
Surcharges Agreement) case, on the basis that
they were time-barred.9
In June 2003, the CFI ruled on the Coe Clerici
Logistics case.10 This concerns an appeal
against a decision by the Commission rejecting a complaint by a ship transporter of coal
for ENEL. The transporter had applied for the
right to perform self-handling on a particular
quay in the port of Ancona linked to an ENEL
depot. Another company had been given a
concession over that quay. The case involved
an alleged infringement of Arts 82 and 86 EC.
The CFI dismissed the application.
In September 2003, the ECJ upheld the CFI’s
judgment in the Volkswagen (parallel imports)
case.11
In October 2003, the ECJ generally upheld the
CFI’s judgment on the Commission’s Steel
Beams decision, imposing e104 million in
fines on various steel-makers. However, the
CFI annulled the judgment as regards Arbed
6. Paras 159–188.
7. Paras 1440–1474.
8. Case T-319/99, Federación Nacional de Empresas de
Instrumentación Cientifica, Médica, Técnica y Dental
(FENIN) v Commission, Judgment of March 4, 2003.
9. Case T-213/00, CMA CGM, Judgment of March 19,
2003.
10. Case T-52/00, Coe Clerici Logistics SpA v Commission, Judgment of June 17, 2003.
11. Case C-338/00P, Volkswagen AG v Commission,
Judgment of September 18, 2003.
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SA and the Commission’s decision in so far as
it concerns that undertaking. The ECJ also
partially annulled the judgment against
Siderúrgica Aristrain Madrid, and referred
the matter back to the CFI to determine the
amount of the fine that Aristrain is still
required to pay.12
12. Case C-176/99P and others, Arbed SA v Commission,
Judgments of October 2, 2003; Court Press Release 82/03.



In October 2003, the CFI essentially upheld
the Commission’s decision in the Opel (parallel imports) case, although it reduced the
fine from e43 million to e35.5 million.13

13. Case T-368/00, Judgment of October 21, 2003; Court
Press Release 91/03.

In the second half of this article, John Ratliff surveys:





Commission cases on cartels, horizontal co-operation, distribution and Articles 82/86 EC (including
the Vitamins and Nintendo decisions published this year).
The current policy focus on opening up the liberal professions to more competition and the
Commission’s consultation to see if reform of the Council liner conference block exemption may
be justified.
Areas of specific interest, notably several Commission cases aiming to foster competition in gas
supply in various parts of Europe.
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